Cultural evolution
Robin:
Hello, Agnes.
Agnes:
Hi, Robin.
Robin:
Today, I'd like us to talk about cultural variety or selection and a potential
critique of modernity.
Agnes:
Sounds good.
Robin:
All right. So start with the context of biological evolution. In biology,
there are species, at least for sexual animals, who can mate or not mate. And
usually, we define a species as all the creatures who could mate with each
other, at least if they were the right age or whatever. And there's two kinds
of evolution that happens in biology. There is evolution within a species.
i.e. some members of the species might develop some new innovation that would
spread in the species by mating with other members of the species until their
descendants could all have the new innovation in the species. And then there's
innovation of species in the sense that species often just have features that
all the members of the species have. and that most of other species don't
have. And then there's evolution by creating new species that have new
features that are shared across all the members of that species. And then over
time, new species appear with new innovations, and they have descended species
that spread those innovations. So two kinds of innovations in biology, within
a species and between species.
Agnes:
Can I ask a question?
Robin:
Yes.
Agnes:
Before you go on. OK. I take it that the evolution within a species, there's a
limit or a constraint to it, which is it can't inhibit the members of the
species from reproducing with one another. That is, the one that did evolve
and the one that didn't. Otherwise, it would then be the evolution of a new
species.
Robin:
Exactly. Yes. OK.
Agnes:
Go on.
Robin:
Right. Okay, so in history we can look at, you know, where most innovations
appeared, where a lot of innovation appeared to last, and it seems like there
was more innovation overall, that is, species to spending with new exciting
capabilities, in places and times, when species were fragmented, i.e. smaller
species, each of which had a smaller scope, and therefore the same overall
metabolism or size of the, you know, ecological niche was divided up among
more species.
Agnes:
And this happened- Wait, wait, sorry. When you said smaller species, that
confused me.
Robin:
Smaller number of members.
Agnes:
Ah, okay.
Robin:
Right. Species with fewer members.
Agnes:
Okay. So- Species with fewer members is more fragmented?
Robin:
Right, so if we imagine a million kinds of deer, they could have one species
which has a million deer or 10 species, each of which has 100,000 deer. Then
that second case would be more fragmented. Innovations in each species of the
deer won't be able to pass on to the other species of deer.
Agnes:
Wait, but the deer, these are all different species of deer. So you're saying
they can't mate with each other, these different species of deer. Exactly. OK.
And so this is the difference between, I mean, deer isn't a genus, right? Or
something bigger than a species, above species. And so it's that that's
fragmented, not the species.
Robin:
Well, I'm just trying to compare two cases where, in one case, a bunch of
animals are all in the same species, say a million animals all in the same
species. And in another case, there's 10 species, each of which has 100,000
animals. OK. And now the same overall number of animals has two possible
scenarios.
Agnes:
Okay.
Robin:
One of which, because they're all in the same species, innovations can spread
more easily among all those million animals. Whereas in the other case, they
can only spread up to the boundary of the species, but we find it much harder
to spread across that boundary.
Agnes:
Got it.
Robin:
But in the second case, there'll be more innovation in the different kinds of
deer or different kinds of animal space in the sense of features that would be
shared across an entire species.
Agnes:
And I mean, so wait, the second case is the more fragmented one.
Robin:
Yes.
Agnes:
Okay. And is it that, so if you have the more fragmented one, you're saying
there would be, it would be easier for an innovation to arise, which is gonna,
be a change in the whole, in that small- An entire species, right.
Robin:
A thing that all the members of a species need to have in common, that kind of
an innovation is more likely to arise in a world where there are just more
species. But innovations that happen within a species where different members
of the species can have different innovations, that's more likely to appear
and spread when the species are larger and less fragmented.
Agnes:
Okay.
Robin:
So this is a trade-off in innovation. There are two key kinds of innovation,
and more of one makes less of the other. And the key parameter is how
fragmented are the species.
Agnes:
Here's why that confuses me a little. You said that in the less fragmented
group of animals, innovation spreads more easily.
Robin:
Of the first kind of innovation, but not the second.
Agnes:
Right, but if it spreads, then won't all the members have it?
Robin:
So yes, eventually. That's the idea. So over time, all of them would
eventually have it. And that's the advantage, that an innovation that any one
of them discover could then spread to all of them, but only up to the boundary
of the species. Spreading innovations between species is much harder in
biological innovations.
Agnes:
Right, and that's true in both cases.
Robin:
Right, but when the species are larger, they can go farther before they reach
this boundary for the first kind of innovation, i.e. the within-species
innovation. But sort of the species-defining features, the features that are
the same for all members of the species, those kind of innovations, to have
more of them, you just need more species. So in history of biology, The ocean
is a place where species tend to be large. That is, many ocean areas are
pretty similar to each other. And so a fish or whatever who can survive in one
part of the ocean can survive in many other parts of the ocean. So the ocean
tends to have large species. Land, however, tends to be more fragmented
because, you know, there's valleys and there's hills and there's mountains and
then there's, you know, deserts and, you know, swamps, etc. There's a lot of
different kinds of niches which are limited spatially. And so that forces
species to be smaller because they have a smaller spatial region in which they
can exist. And at the border, they can no longer function because, say, this
is no longer a swamp. It's a desert or something. And they're not designed to
survive in those other environments. And on land, this is even more true near
rivers. Rivers are especially places within a very short spatial distance.
Things change a lot. That is, something that survives in a river doesn't
really survive five feet up on the banks of the river. It only works in the
river itself. And then rivers even change over the length of them in terms of
whether they're slow and smooth versus steep and rough, things like that. So
we see in the world, there are places where species are more naturally
fragmented by geography, and there are other places where they are not. And
the observation is that overall, more innovation seems to come from the
fragmented places. And this suggests that that second kind of innovation is
more important than the first, at least among biological evolution. which
might be surprising because you might've thought, you know, the things that
are in common across species, that wouldn't be as important as all those
little details by which the members vary.
Agnes:
Right. Okay.
Robin:
This is the context. And then we want to make an analogy of human cultural
evolution. So by analogy, humans are broken into cultures. That is groups of
people who share a culture and interact a lot. And then other cultures where
people don't interact as much across cultural boundaries. So we can think of,
you know, especially the world of 10,000 years ago or even 3000 years ago is
full of lots of little cultures. all around the world, where within each
culture they spoke the same language, had similar religions, similar customs,
dress, food, et cetera. And then innovations within a culture, say a different
way to prepare a meat or something, could spread more easily within a culture.
And then they were harder to spread across cultural boundaries because of
language, distances, hostility, all sorts of reasons why it would be hard to
spread innovations across cultural boundaries. And so now we'd have the same
two trade-offs in human evolution in terms of innovation. Within a culture,
the bigger the culture, the more in innovation, any one part of it could
spread to the rest. But the less we could, humans could have learned things
through the variation of cultures and new cultures appearing that have new
features across the entire culture. And this would have just been a historical
trade-off. And it's not obvious we would have gotten the trade-off right. But
in history, when there were lots of small fragmented cultures, we could
presume that cultural evolution of cultures was strong and that the cultures
would have been very well adapted to their circumstances and very eagerly
adopting innovations as they appeared. But that in that context, each culture
wouldn't have accumulated very many innovations within itself in terms of how
to do things. All right, so now the key context here is that in the last few
centuries, first, we had the rise of nations. You and I read Peasants into
Frenchmen recently. And before the rise of France, there were all these little
local cultures that were pretty insular from each other. People lived in one
little area, and they only knew people nearby, and they didn't travel very
far. And they even had different languages and customs. And so France was a
world of many cultures. And then after the transition, a nation was formed.
And now they're Frenchmen, and now they share a culture across all of France.
And that means they trade and travel farther, and they depend on each other
more, and they make things in one place that are used in another. So they have
a larger division of labor. And innovations that appear in any one part of
France can more easily spread to all of France. And so there was the rise of
the nation state a few centuries ago. And all around the world, nations arose,
which produced these larger scale cultural integrations of nations. And this
coincided with a rapid increase in innovation in the world of technology and
firms and shipping and manufacturing and farming, all sorts of kinds of
techniques.
Agnes:
Which is the opposite of what you would predict, right?
Robin:
No, it's exactly what I would predict.
Agnes:
Well, your biological analogy suggests that when you have bigger things,
there's less innovation.
Robin:
Right. But if we're focused on one type of innovation, i.e. the within culture
innovation, this theory says we should see more of that. And we did see more
of that.
Agnes:
Okay. But if we just say overall innovation also increased.
Robin:
That's less clear. Right. So, right. So I want to focus your attention on sort
of the micro, you know, the mechanics and production technologies and things
like that. Those are the kinds of innovation that, in fact, increased a lot
over the last few centuries. That is, we learned a lot about how to do many
specific things, and we spread those fast. And so, first there's the rise of
the nation state, and then there's also just the rise of world integration.
That is, the world has become more integrated together over the last century,
certainly, and certainly over the last half century, where not only do we
trade across the world, we communicate and travel across the world. And as a
result, we've even had more of a world culture. where especially among elites,
elites often identify with elites elsewhere and less identify with the elites
of other people of their own country. And we've had this increasing
integration of world culture, which continues to coincide with rapid
innovation of many kinds of particular details like transportation technology,
computer technology, entertainment, et cetera, right? And that's all makes
sense in the sense of thinking of all that as the sort of thing that, you
know, innovates within cultures.
Agnes:
Right.
Robin:
Okay. But now let's go think about the other kind of innovation, the kind of
innovation that would be of features that cultures, you know, all the members
of a culture would share. We might notice that, well, we've had change in the
sense of the merging of cultures into nations and then into the world, but we
haven't had that much new culture in terms of features that everybody shares
that is we've had fewer species, if it were, of culture. And so that's mostly
not what's changing or innovating. It's the many detailed things that we can
share within a culture that has been the driving force of growth and
innovation for the last few centuries.
Agnes:
So I find it a little bit hard to, um, classify some bit of innovation and try
to decide which kind it should be. Let's take the musical innovations of the
1960s through, I don't know, 1980 or something. Which kind is that?
Robin:
So I think the key difference would be that innovations that are shared by a
culture, there's gonna be strong pressures of conformity that keep everybody
near some common norm. So, in music, you know, if we all, if there's a
standard, say, set of scales of music, and you think, right, there's other
possible scales of music, if we really don't like music that's in other
scales, and we like the music of the scales we all share in our culture, then
you might notice that, in fact, we haven't changed the scales of our music.
But where it's okay as long as you stay within the scales to maybe innovate
some new kinds of beats or new kinds of melodies or, you know, kinds of
patterns. To the extent we don't have strong conformity pressures that
suppress those kinds of variations. then people have been allowed to invent
new songs and those new songs spread and then nations and then the world
shares and benefits from the spread of these innovations of the kind of things
we kind of allow to be different and vary. But say a different thing we don't
vary is say You know, allowing say sex with children or sex with animals or
something if there's a whole cultural taboo across the entire society against
such things, then we're not going to have much innovation. In those things,
because whenever a local variation appears, it gets squashed because the
culture wants that to be uniform. It doesn't. Each culture wants to have that
be common across the culture.
Agnes:
Right. Okay, good. So this helps me like actually, um, frame certain,
sometimes I see certain like debates on Twitter that strike me as puzzling
debates, like, uh, Is it terrible if somebody arranges their bookshelves by
color? Sometimes people are outraged by this, by somebody, which I do this, I
arrange my bookshelves by color, I arrange everything by color, so my books
too, of course. And then there's always going to be the group of people who
are just like, hey, let people live their lives, you know? And then the other
people who are like, no, that's terrible. And now I see that what they're
battling over is which kind of innovation this is. That is, if it gets itself
classified as the within a culture kind, then we're going to be permissive
about it and just let it spread as it wants to spread. But if it gets
classified as the culture defining one, then everyone's got to fall into line.
It's interesting to me that we seem to be able to actually be unsure about
that and be in a state of kind of debate and embattlement about this question
about a lot of different things. That is, this question seems to show up
repeatedly. Which of these two categories does this innovation belong in?
We're like fighting over it all the time. Anyway, does that seem, does that,
Robin:
But let me give another example just to make it clearer to you and the
audience. A wonderful book by a guy named Stuntz, who is a Harvard law
professor about the history of the law in the US. Actually, I should find the
title here, too, because I have it. The Collapse of American Criminal Justice.
William Stuntz. His story was that the history of US law was that initially
the US Constitution gave enormous discretion for states and localities to just
have laws be different there. And the Constitution wasn't very constraining
about those variations. And so that there was a lot of variation in the law
around the United States. And so the definition of US legal culture was, you
know, pretty tolerant and inclusive of a wide variety of changes. And then
over time, particular moral crises appeared. like slavery but also
prostitution and drugs from China and other sorts of things wherein some
people in the country felt there was a moral outrage of people behaving badly
and they pushed for suppressing this legal variation like if they didn't like
prostitution they were going to make sure that nobody was allowed to have
prostitution they don't like drugs are going to make sure nobody and same for
slavery and that Supreme Court rulings that supported these moral campaigns
then ended up restricting how states could be different in their law. And then
now we have a much more constrained legal order, wherein the center has much
more control over the states and localities in the US, because more and more
issues were decided to be things the entire culture should share. In current
culture should share its attitude on drugs and prostitution and slavery, etc.
And once they were categorized by these moral companions as things we must all
share must not allow local variation on. then there's less cultural innovation
or variation in those things. Like once upon a time when prostitution could
vary by state or county, then there would be cultural variation where even
though in a county everybody had to have the same stance toward prostitution
by the shared law, different counties could have different stances and
therefore there could be cultural evolution and selection among some of them
succeeding and others failing and copying and things like that. the more you
suppress that variation, the more the entire United States has the same
culture. And so then it's like having a larger species where more internal
innovation can happen, but less large cultural scale innovation.
Agnes:
But there's also a bit of a paradoxical quantity, which is that It's like
having a larger species, but we're moving more and more of these innovations
to being species defining, right? And so we're taking the attitude that
generally goes with a small species and we're applying it to a large species.
Maybe the way to think about it is somehow, I don't know if there's any
biological analog to that, but somehow like our environment changed, like we
moved into the ocean or something. And so we, like, even though we're really
big, where innovations are, I don't know, regulated in this way as though they
were the innovations that pertain to a small.
Robin:
We are choosing more and more things to say they define our culture. Culture
is defining more aspects of ourselves.
Agnes:
Right, which sounds like we're getting smaller and smaller, right? That would
correspond, except we're not getting smaller. We're just behaving more and
more like we're small, which is weird.
Robin:
I'm not actually sure that in biological species, larger species have more
features, less features that define them. I think it's just more about an
environment being more the same, typically. Right.
Agnes:
Right. And so that may be a way to think about it is that our environment is
getting more and more the same.
Robin:
Or we are just following sort of moral habits of enforcing popular views on
everyone. So we're just being less liberal.
Agnes:
But that might sort of be what it is for our environment to be the same
somehow, like our cultural environment.
Robin:
Well, we are imposing it or something. But anyway, so there is this basic
value question of whether we're making a good or bad choice here. And the
usual framing of that is in terms of how confident are we in our morality? So
this is basically the liberalism or tolerance question. To what extent can a
society be composed of many subparts that have different attitudes toward
morality and values and culture? And in the usual liberal society, the idea
would be some sort of minimal set of requirements, the requirements that are
the minimum necessary for us to all get along with each other and to function
together as, say, different religions and different ethnicities, et cetera,
have different cultures. but that we are in some sense becoming less liberal
as we more decide that something that many of us share, say, disliking
prostitution, must be something that we all share and sort of imposing more
commonality on culture. And the usual moral framing would be, well, if we're
pretty sure that that's in fact right, that prostitution is bad, then this is
a good thing to be doing. And then the usual counter argument is, well, how
short can you be you know different cultures see things differently aren't you
being arrogant to impose the views of your cultures on others. This is the
usual framing of this liberality or tolerance or diversity issue in terms of
these choices.
Agnes:
um I mean. it seems to me that say we were more liberal and so we just allowed
there to be some prostitution and some non-prostitution, that would be quite
different from us becoming fragmented, right?
Robin:
No, it would be in the sense allowing each county to be different about
prostitution would be a more of a fragmentation of of culture. That is, there
would be more cultural evolution. That is, some places would try and some
places wouldn't and then we might learn over time which places prospered more
and people might copy the practices of the places that prospered more.
Agnes:
Okay, so then here I think I'm a bit confused because It seems to me that
there is a difference. And this gets back to my original question about how
we're defining species. There's a difference between something like, let's say
we decide, look, some people want their bookshelves to be coded by color.
Other people want them to be in alphabetical order. We just let people do what
they want. We just let these innovations spread how they want. In that world,
there is no species that is defined by the feature of having color-coded
bookshelves. It's just the innovation spreads where it wants, and people can
still... Right. Right? And that's, as I understand it, the liberal world.
which is very different from the fragmented world in which there's some group
of people who go and say, no, we're the rainbow bookshelf people, and we're
not going to talk to or communicate too much with the non-rainbow bookshelf
people. We're going to interact among ourselves. That's not the liberal world.
And so it seems to me that us becoming more liberal would not be us becoming
more fragmented. It would be us becoming less fragmented, but having more
innovations that can spread within our culture without fragmenting us.
Robin:
So for colored bookshelves, let's imagine, you know, bookshelves composed of
two things. There's the bookshelves themselves and the books themselves and
say those can spread across a large scope, but there's the practice of
colorizing bookshelves. And say, within a county, it might be a local culture
there that everybody just has to colorize their bookshelves, because otherwise
you'd be ashamed that people would laugh at yourselves as they came to your
dinner. That would be a local culture promoting colorized bookshelves, which
would be different than just an individual liking colored bookshelves. So we
want to distinguish what level of innovation it's at. So that was where we
started. There's two kinds of innovation. One kind of innovation would be in
just individual practices, i.e. let everybody do with the bookshelves how they
like. And another would be if there was a culture of pushing for either
colored bookshelves or not, that would be at a cultural level.
Agnes:
OK, but that's. That's not something that you get by being permissive. That's
like something you get by being impermissive. That is some group succinct.
That's not the liberal world. That's the illiberal world.
Robin:
Well, but the idea is that say within a Jewish subculture, you could be shamed
for not following the Jewish religion, but in the larger community, you're
allowed to choose to be part of the Jewish subculture or not, same for
Christianity or other ideas. So the idea of a liberal world was in part the
idea that there could be these distinct subcultures and that within each
culture, you would have different sets of norms. and that we could all get
along by sharing a world where different subcultures still lived in the same
cities and had the same criminal law systems and went to war together and
things like that.
Agnes:
Yeah, I mean, I think there's just a question in what sense do we live in the
same world? Like, I think that with certain, you know, it depends which group
of Jews you're thinking about, but like, if you take the most religious ones,
most people would say they're illiberal. They don't go to war with the rest of
us. They're in some sense, not part of our culture. We still might put up with
them, like put up with their existence and say, we even, we value that they
exist or whatever, but that's, there's a version of liberalism which sort of
says, well, we all have these different commitments to, what is Rawls' phrase?
Something like systematic doctrines or whatever. Like we all have these like
religious beliefs or whatever, but like we come together as citizens. We sort
of set those things aside. We set metaphysics aside. It's not really that
important to us. And we can engage on this other level with one another and
ignore the fact that we have these differences and live together in a
substantive sense. on its other questions. And I think what you're really
suggesting is something quite different, which is different little segregated
societies that still have some way of letting each other exist, as they did in
human beings 1,000 years ago. This is what was happening 1,000 years ago. Not
a very liberal time, right? That's not the normal way to describe that time is
liberalism. It's just that there was a great deal of variety and a great deal
of intolerance. Intolerance is how you sustain the variety. But people didn't
all just get rid of each other or kill each other so you could sustain the
variety. But to me, that's not liberalism. That's something other than
liberalism. It's variety.
Robin:
I don't much care whether the word liberalism applies, but I wanted to just
highlight this concept of culture as a shared thing among a community.
Agnes:
That seems fine. The place where I objected was when you were moving from, oh,
we're becoming more intolerant, for instance, about prostitution. And so if we
became more tolerant and more liberal, we'd be moving towards this world. And
what I'm suggesting is we'd be moving away from it. What we need is more
intolerance. That is, we need more groups that are like, we absolutely, we're
going to make our opposition to prostitution and pornography the core of our
existence, and we're going to secede from the rest of society on the strength
of that view. And that's illiberal.
Robin:
Right. But if the world, if, say, the Supreme Court declared that prostitution
must be legal everywhere, then they wouldn't be allowed to prohibit it in
their small part of the world.
Agnes:
Right. So they'd have to secede from the United States.
Robin:
Right. Or the United States could be more forgiving and allowing each little
geographic area to have its own different laws.
Agnes:
Right.
Robin:
And then each area could basically have a local culture that was different
from other local cultures. And so the key concept that I'm trying to highlight
here is the idea of not just individual practices, but cultural practices
where a group of people together shares some norms such that they all think
and do it roughly the same way. And that's the kind of thing that modernity
might be not promoting or selecting as much. There might be much less cultural
evolution. than there used to be, even though there's much more of the other
kind of evolution in individual practices. So I want to highlight that we've
made a trade off of modernity. We've got a lot more of the kinds of evolution
and innovation of practices that can vary from individual to individual. But
the kinds of things where a whole group, a culture together wants to be
different together That's the kind of thing that the modern world isn't
experimenting with as many variations on.
Agnes:
Right. And it seems to me, in fact, that the remnants of that or the traces
where it can still be seen are the places where it can be monetized mostly for
the purposes of tourism. So we're like, we want France to be French, because
when we visit there, we're like, ooh, I'm tasting something different. So to
that, there's some pressure holding these cultures and places, which is like,
we want them to be different when we visit them. But of course, we all want to
visit each other, and then that's going to dilute those differences. It's
going to be like a front or something. It's almost like every village is a
Potemkin village, putting forward their difference in order to attract the
visitors who make it the same. It seems to me that the pressure that drives
the homogenization is the pressure of culture is coordination. That is, I
think you think, well, look, we could still cooperate and coordinate with each
other enough to get the benefits of, say, economic exchanges while having
groups of people who have these really strongly different moral principles.
And I think that it's just not obvious that that's true. I'll take one
example, because you're about to interrupt me, and that's my example, is that
you and I have different practices, okay? We come from different cultures when
it comes to interrupting. And, you know, one approach that we could take is
like, I could just be permissive about your more interrupt-y culture, but
that's not how I am. I'm like, no, Robin, I'm unwilling to communicate with
you if you interrupt me, and I'm gonna lay down the law and I'm gonna force us
to have one norm here that we both adhere to, because otherwise we can't like
cooperate, coordinate. And I think, now you might think, but it's crazy to
think that colored bookshelves are gonna be that, that I can't like, go over
to someone's house if they have colored bookshelves because my eyeballs will
fall out or something. But I think that we're experimenting with and we're
sort of unsure about how much do we need to sort of line up in order to
coordinate. And I think a lot of these pressures come from the coordination
pressure.
Robin:
I want to admit there's likely a trade-off. That is, the more we allow
different places to have different distinct cultures, then the harder it will
be to share other kinds of innovations, just like with biology there you know
the smaller species are in fact, less able to share innovation spread
innovations farther. So, the analog there is there's two kinds of innovations
and there's a trade-off, there's a key parameter. And if you turn that
parameter, you get more of one and less of the other. And to make the analogy
with culture, two different kinds of innovations. And in the last few
centuries, we've turned up the dial a lot in one direction. So, we get a lot
more of technology and entertainment and you know, wealth basically, it's
kinds of, you know, organizations, all of that kind of innovation has been
wonderful and vast, but the point is to notice that's coming at the expense of
another kind of innovation, which is the innovation in cultures and their sort
of shared cultural norms and practices. And now you might think, well, we seem
to be doing fine, so maybe I guess that's just not very important among
humans, even if it was important among biology. That might be a tempting
conclusion to draw here from the fact that we seem to be getting rich and we
like it, and we don't seem to be missing all the different cultural variation
that much, so why is there a problem? And so this is where I mentioned that
the reason I noticed this whole thing recently was that I noticed that
fertility is declining worldwide, and there are these small number of
exceptional places with high fertility, and they are very insular subcultures
that are small and fragmented. And our theory of cultural evolution that we've
discussed predicts this in the sense that if fertility is a culturally shared
thing, that is, the values and norms of a culture tend to produce the average
fertility of that culture, then, you know, when we have large cultures,
they're going to have large shared levels of fertility, and we won't see much
innovation in fertility variation among the large species or the large
cultures, we would see a lot more among the few small fragmented cultures,
because that's just where innovation happens more at the cultural level. So,
and now once I realize I really value that fertility innovation, that is, I
really don't like the fact the world is just declining in population, it looks
like it'll just do that for many centuries, then I realize this, you know,
these small fragmented subcultures which are very insular, i.e. they are very
separate from other cultures by holding strong boundaries and resisting
outside influence and being able to perpetuate themselves having a very
different local culture. That is allowing them to have cultural innovation at
the level of culture, and that's something you need a lot of if you're going
to get fertility, i.e. variations of fertility that then produce selection to
produce growth. And so that makes me more value cultural innovation, because I
realize there's just even just one case where it matters a whole lot, and
without it, you have very dire consequences.
Agnes:
Okay, so there's two things I want to ask you about. Okay, the first is just
the idea that fertility is something where there could be variation in it
makes sense when we're talking about that level of culture but at the level of
biology. Isn't every species just trying to be as fertile as they can possibly
be? There's variation in success or something because the more you've eaten
off. But it's not like there's some group of dolphins that are just avoiding
having children or something. So I actually don't understand, at a biological
level, even the idea of variation in fertility.
Robin:
Well, in biology, there would certainly be variation in fertility strategies.
So they say R versus K selection, whether you have many small kids or a few
high investment kids. Do you have kids all year round or just in one season?
Do you have special places you go dig a hole to raise kids versus do it
elsewhere? There's a huge variation in fertility strategies in biology. those
strategies could be counterproductive. And the way the biology works it out is
through selections. So for example, there's a kind of turtle that meets in one
spot in the ocean and where they all get together there to mate, right? So
that's a shared species thing, right? Individual turtles can't really deviate
from the fact that they all meet in one place to mate every year. They all
have to show up there. So that's a feature of the entire species that is tied
to fertility. And if that species makes a bad choice about that, then species
selection will select those kind of turtles out, but individual selection
among turtles within the species won't do that. It'll have to be something
that treats the whole species and makes it rewarded or not that will produce
species-level variation and that sort of thing.
Agnes:
Right, so what we have to say is that many of the people in the society
deciding not to have kids, and then also many of the ones who decided to have
kids deciding to have fewer kids is our fertility strategy. And it's a poor
strategy, as it turns out. That's the idea. That would be a fertility strategy
is to not do much fertility. And predictably, it doesn't work out.
Robin:
Fertility varies a lot by culture, and we can already see a lot of details of
which cultural factors promote fertility or hinder it. And so there's just a
lot of variation in cultures in various elements that promote or hinder
fertility. But when we're all part of one big world culture, then they'll just
be the one big choice of that. And we all will go along with the consequences
of that. But when there's many fragmented cultures, then some of them may
fail, but others succeed because of there'll be selection at the cultural
level for the ones that have a practice that works out in increasing the
population.
Agnes:
OK, good. OK, now I have another question. One thought you might have is that
this move towards a more globalized world has, we've all landed on a
particular fertility strategy, namely not having many kids. And that one
happens to be a poor strategy. You end up with very few kids. But we could
have had a big global culture that landed on one of the really fertile ones.
That's option one. Option two is, no, actually, conceptually, there's some
kind of pressure where Coordinating at this giant scale, we're gonna end up on
one of the lower fertility strategies. I'm curious whether you a priori have a
view on that question.
Robin:
So I guess one way to think about it is in the space of possible cultures, how
many of them are how bad? That is, are good cultures rare in the space of
possible cultures or are they plentiful? So what you can tell from cultural
evolution is that when you have just many small fragmented cultures, each of
which is undergoing a lot of selection pressure. if they start to move away
from the functional variations, then those cultures will just go away. And
because you're repeatedly pushing them to, holding them to account to some
measures of success, then in a world of many small fragmented cultures, they
are roughly gonna be in a good state in terms of being able to promote that
culture, including fertility. then as, say, a small tiny culture grows and
merges with other ones and moves up in strange unknown directions, the more
unlikely any one random place in cultural space is to be healthy, the more
likely it is that random drift would just take you to bad places. Now if most
places are good, then random drift will mostly take you to good places, but if
in the space of culture most of the spots are not very good then there's just
more likely you're going to randomly drift to some place that's not so good.
If you were right close to the edge of starvation or something, or the edge of
winning or losing wars, you would quickly be brought back to some sort of
discipline by those sort of competitive pressures. But in the last few
centuries, we've been getting rich and more peaceful. And so the idea is if
the world culture gets dysfunctional, it doesn't immediately get disciplined.
It's mainly gonna be disciplined through this long-term process of just
declining population, but that's gonna take centuries.
Agnes:
Yeah, so I see that that's one way that you could give that answer, that is
the answer that it would be predictable that we, maybe there are many bad
spots and so we drifted to one of them. I was thinking that it's at least
possible, I don't see a strong argument for this, but it's possible that the
connection is deeper. I think so too.
Robin:
So I have a hypothesis about how it might be, but I just thought, that might
be a distraction from the larger issue to go into why exactly it might be more
systematic than in fact we are having lower fertility. So I have a story about
that, but I worry about distracting us from the other topics here.
Agnes:
Okay, well maybe, so maybe we'll, like, I mean, this will help in terms of,
maybe you'll want to say that, but let me tell you my other sort of
observation. it's like I could translate everything you said and it almost
sounds to me like a giant like invective against globalization and capitalism
and gains from trade and like all the people who are like um cultural
appropriation, all the people who are on the other side from you as an
economist, now suddenly you're joining their team. And the thought is like,
oh, well, the benefits of cooperation and gains from trade are actually
outweighed by the secret mystery value of the inner truth of the local
culture. And so I kind of just wanted to frame it that way for a minute, just
so that our listeners would be appropriately shocked by what you're saying.
Robin:
I'm shocked myself, which is why I'm talking about this.
Agnes:
And I think, sorry, and here's why it matters whether it's more systematic.
Because if you think that somehow it's not an accident, but rather that when
we just start trying to coordinate at this scale, then you really think that
our devastation is actually being produced by cooperation on some level.
Robin:
We're focusing on one kind of cooperation at the expense of another, or one
kind of evolution of these.
Agnes:
So that's why I'm- Large scale cooperation, and ever larger scale, right? Over
ever greater distances.
Robin:
Right, but I would still put the blame on the attempts to force the larger
community to share more culture, rather than just share a space of trade.
Agnes:
Yeah, so that's where I think you're trying to stake out some kind of liberal
position where there isn't any. That is, the attempts to force is just the
spread of more coordination. That's just what it looks like. No one's forcing
anyone to do anything. We're settling on an equilibrium. And some of that
settling on equilibrium involves, like, people having angry faces or doing
mean things to people. That's always been the way it goes, right? But as we
become more, like, you know, coordinating over larger spaces with more and
more people, we become more and more alike. And then we also start to police
the forms of being alike, it seems to me.
Robin:
So take the example of organ sales, buying organs from people. Now, in
principle, the world could allow that to vary. It could be different in
different parts of the world. Some places you could allow organ sales, others
not. But it turns out that there is a global community of bioethicists who
because they are part of a shared community have a shared norm about that. And
they are shared cultural norm is that it's disapproved. And because of that,
basically it's disapproved everywhere in the world. The only partial exception
is Iran, which only allows organ sales at a set price by the government for,
you know, and it's very controlled market. And even that bioethicists are
getting together all the time and talking about how are they gonna make Iran
stop? So it's part of the sense that the bioethicists have a shared culture,
which includes a shared morality, and then that makes them try to suppress
variation that otherwise could exist.
Agnes:
Right. So I think that in raising that, like, as an issue, like, the world in
which everyone was more tolerant isn't the world in which there's tons of
fragmentation. And so, like, it seems to me that that situation is kind of,
you know, we get caught up in the paradox of liberalism, basically, which is
that we We want to be intolerant of intolerance. And, you know, like, there
are certain things where it's going to be beyond the pale and we have to
somehow make a decision there about what's going to fall into that. But I
guess I really think that the standard set of like, you're bringing two things
together that I don't think go together. One is the standard set of
libertarian talking points, where it's like, why can't we let there be organ
sales in some places, or even if you don't want them everywhere, in some
places? And this other thought, which is super anti-libertarian, and is
saying, maybe we should just allow the world to go back. to when there was no
liberalism and people could like constrain people from getting gains from
trade so that they were locked into their particular culture and that's not
that's not being liberal and permissive.
Robin:
Well but so these are two different kinds of libertarian concepts which have
often been in conflict with each other and I'm happy to highlight the
difference here and say I'm taking one side, not the other.
Agnes:
But what I'm saying is, I think that getting all the bioethicists to allow, if
we convinced people of that set of libertarian arguments, and they allowed
organ sales in some places or whatever, we would not be moving towards more
fertility, in my view.
Robin:
Well, we could be allowing more cultural variation more ways in which local
cultures could be different. And that's so for, I mean, let's let's take the
Amish, for example.
Agnes:
Right.
Robin:
There's a sense in which the Amish are just violating a lot of these norms
that many people feel strongly about and it's just kind of hard to understand
why they're being allowed to be so different. That is, they don't educate
their children as much. They don't let their kids exposed to more variety of
culture and the world. There's just a sense in which they are a very insular
culture that very much constrains members' behaviors in ways that violates
many of the larger liberal norms about how individuals ought to be treated.
Even by a local subculture is there a sense of which if an individual parent
was treating their kids like that separately from the religion, they might
well be called mistreating their kids and then my kids might be taken away
from them. There's a way in which they're allowed to be more different because
they are seen as this special culture than individuals would allow. And so
that, in some sense, you know, the question is, how much of that is the world
going to allow?
Agnes:
Right, so I think you should think of it as cultural secession, right? So we
like allow the They're not fully succeeding.
Robin:
They're allowed to live here and trade with people and pay taxes and things
like that.
Agnes:
To some degree, but this works partly because they themselves place a whole
bunch of limits on how much they're willing to trade with people, how much
they're willing to interact.
Robin:
But that produces fertility. So the higher level observation is just Again,
there's two kinds of innovation. In the last few centuries, we've got
gangbusters of one type at the expense of less of the other type. You might
think the other type doesn't really matter that much, but with respect to
fertility, it matters enormously. And that makes you realize maybe there's a
lot of other stuff that matters for it that we're also missing. And that's the
overall message to get across here. This is a, maybe if not a mistake of
modernity, a big risk modernity is taking, promoting one kind of innovation at
the expense of another. And that seems to be realized in our fertility
mistake, which if we allow say the Amish or ready Jews or whatever to be
different, then they will save us from that mistake eventually. And then the
question is how will they deal with this trade-off between you know, the
different scales of innovation.
Agnes:
Right, right. Because perhaps it'll just be the same thing happens all over
again. They grow big, they decide they want to, you know, all cooperate. And
then, you know, some some sprouts have to grow up and it'll be like
Nietzsche's eternal recurrence. We just repeat this thing over and over again.
Right.
Robin:
I mean, that's why I'm trying to draw a lesson here. I was saying once we
understand this, maybe we should realize that we should push against our
natural inclinations and move more to a world where, in fact, we promote and
tolerate at least more cultural variation, more distinctive cultures that do
things different, but still can mix with the rest of us by trading with us.
Agnes:
I think that actually maybe we already are pretty tolerant of that. It's just
that there are very, very few such groups. So there may be some people who
want to do organ sales, right? But they haven't gotten themselves together
into the organ sales community that's going to be united on this one question,
and we're all going to live together and whatever.
Robin:
And that's really hard to do, right? Right, right. But the issue might not be
that we're not tolerant. The issue is not that we're not tolerant. That is, it
might be that, say, before the Amish got this big, we were very intolerant of
them when they were only 500 people or something, and we should have been more
tolerant of groups that size so that they could grow into bigger ones.
Agnes:
Right, but that's probably not going to come by way of us changing our minds
about organ sales, right? Because these little groups, they're going to look
like maybe cults or whatever. So it'll probably be more like tolerance of
cults. So I feel like you should spell out the implications. I think spelling
out the implications of you in terms of the organ sales thing is just very
confusing. We could become super tolerant about that. I wouldn't help. But
yeah, I think that we look down on cults, but maybe you're like, well, cults
are the future because they're these potential insular communities. And so we
need to protect crazy offshoots. The problem is that sometimes we're scared
they're going to become violent or whatever. So we need to somehow be able to
judge.
Robin:
They are violent sometimes.
Agnes:
Right. There you go.
Robin:
right so the idea is we should just once we realize the high value that cults
can achieve we might should be more tolerant of cults and more willing to
accept their costs so it's just like say high art you and i discussed before
basically there are these high artists who have achieved great art in our
world and people there's the standard story that artists like are difficult to
deal with, and have more perversions, and are more selfish, and more trouble
to be around, and more disruptive. But we decide that because art is valuable,
we're going to more tolerate the disruptions, even of unsuccessful artists,
even of the ones who don't become famous. We're just going to be more
forgiving of artists. And you might want to have the same attitude toward
cults. Once you realize just what cults can achieve and how important they are
when they successfully achieve high cultum, we will want to be more supportive
and forgiving of cults. Even maybe give them a tax exemption. I came up with
your slogan.
Agnes:
Your slogan is cultivate cults. That's your solution to the fertility problem.
Robin:
Well, not just the fertility, just all of the other ways in which we might be
missing cultural evolution, right? We're just missing out on other kinds of
cultural variation and not exploring the space of possible cultures and
culture ways to explore the space of possible cultures.
Agnes:
Yeah. I mean, I think that, right. So I think that the, you know, the, the
kind of stuff we're going to have to tolerate, um, It's going to look to
people, and I will go for the farce and say it will be child abuse. That is
sort of the intentional kind of seclusion of children from, you know, a set of
opportunities.
Robin:
sexual abuse in the sense of people, right?
Agnes:
And career abuse? Because it's going to come of them. Yeah. No, that's
interesting. I mean, that's an interesting conclusion placed to land from the
fertility problem. I feel like you had these temporary allies in the kind of,
you know, Catholic, religious Catholics, who are into having a lot of kids.
They thought you were their friend for a little while. I think you're about to
part ways with them.
Robin:
Well, but to many people, those kind of Catholics are cultists.
Agnes:
Oh, absolutely. But they may not be as friendly to the new ones, the fresh
ones. No one likes the new cults, the ones that are just coming into being,
because that's when they're at their craziest.
Robin:
Raises the issue. I long ago realized there is not a natural alliance amongst
contrarians. From a distance, it feels like, oh, you weird people should get
along with those other weird people because you're both weird. But weird
people do not generally want to get along with other weird people. They
usually want to say, the way I'm weird, it looks weird to you, but it really
makes sense. And that's why it's a different kind of weirdness than all these
other kinds of weirdnesses. Was where people wanted to distance themselves
from all the other kinds of weirdnesses, because they want to say my weirdness
is exceptional. You will eventually come to accept my thing as not weird. You
happen to see it weird. Now that's a mistake. And I'm going to try to persuade
you to see it otherwise.
Agnes:
Correct. So are we a, Are we do we instantiate this rule or are we an
exception to it?
Robin:
Are we weird?
Agnes:
Yes, we are both weird in different ways. Yes. Okay. Both weird in different
ways.
Robin:
And, uh, we have probably found a exceptional alliance. I mean, you and I
would each claim that we aren't naturally affiliated with generic weird
people. We've only happened to find this other particular weird person and
find something in them that we think is actually not justly seen as weird. As
we know that we are different.
Agnes:
I think you are weird. I mean, I'm not sure we have an alliance.
Robin:
Well, maybe we don't. That's what I'm saying. I'm not sure.
Agnes:
Maybe we're just instantiating the rule, which is why we disagree so much. I
don't know.
Robin:
But we're at least sharing a podcast together and sharing these conversations
together.
Agnes:
Yep. OK, I feel like that's a good place to end.
Robin:
All right. Until next time, bye, fellow weirdo. Bye.