Continuing Education. with Arnold Brooks
Robin:
Hello, Agnes. Hello, Arnold.
Arnold:
Hi, Robin.
Agnes:
Hi, Robin. Um, so today we're gonna talk about a question that is the most
common question that I get, um, for a request for advice. Uh, uh, I get this
request, I would say, um, you know, maybe at least 10 times a year. Uh, and it
is from somebody who, um... Let's pick this form of it. Um, uh, the more
popular form is, "I- I'm an undergraduate. I'm about to graduate. I majored in
philosophy, but, um, what comes next? That is, how do I somehow keep this
philosophy thing in my life after I graduate? I really enjoyed it. It, you
know, uh... I was passionate about it. I learned a lot, um, but I don't quite
wanna go to graduate school. Um, that is, that's not the direction I want my
life to take. Uh, that seems like too much of a commitment to philosophy, um,
and also for various reasons, I have other career ideas for myself. But I also
don't just wanna, like, forget about philosophy forever, and just set it aside
in favor of the rest of my life. What do I do? How do I preserve the
philosophical education that I've had?" I'll add, just as an addendum, that I
also get a version of this question from people who maybe they did or maybe
they didn't major in philosophy, but they're older, and they're just like: "I
want more philosophy in my life. Um, what do I do?" Uh, okay. Arnold, uh,
Arnold- so Arnold and I- um, Arnold also recently got this question from a
student, and he was very unsatisfied with my answers to this question. Uh, and
so now we're gonna explore... Arnold prop- is gonna propose a candidate
answer, and, uh, and, and then I want to have you evaluate it, and maybe you
have different answers. Okay, Arnold, candidate answer.
Arnold:
Yeah, so, uh, uh, let me lay down a few constraints on the problem so as to
give my answer a little more, um, bite maybe. And, and in general, one might
say that, um, um, the- this is in, in some sense a question, like, what, what
does a, a, a, a liberal education or, um, um, uh, some time spent in school
developing sort of an intellectual life, um, w- what's supposed to be the way
that that shows up in, uh, one's life? Um, so the, uh, uh... Obviously,
there's the answer, go to grad school and become an academic. That, that isn't
suited to very many people. Uh, uh, uh, e- even a tiny fraction of the people
who believe that they want that. And, um, uh, so we've often... I think Agnes
and I have both often suggested to students that they do things like set up
reading groups with their friends, um, find other sort of people who are also
interested in talking about philosophy, and talk, talk to them about it, to
keep reading philosophy, um, and maybe to write philosophy. Uh, uh, uh, but
these answers are unsatisfying because they, uh, don't say what you're doing,
they just say how you're doing it. Um, they don't say what, like, why are you
supposed to be talking to your friends? What would make that count as a
success or a failure, um-
Agnes:
What are you trying to achieve-
Arnold:
Right
Agnes:
... in a reading group?
Arnold:
Right. Um, uh, and it, you know, it's not like this is supposed to produce
some kind of saleable product. It's, it's more that, um, there needs to be
something holding this activity together as a, you know, now that the degree
is, is one.
Agnes:
So you can tell whether you're doing it well or badly, for example.
Arnold:
Right. And so, um, the best idea I've come up with, uh, in the last few days
that I've been thinking about this in earnest, um, is that a person who wants
to keep philosophy in their life or, or, you know, continue to be, in some
sense, a philosopher, despite m- moving on from the degree and not going to
grad school, um- and, and maybe this is actually also good advice for anybody
who wants to go to grad school, is that what they should do is come up with a
coherent set of ideas about how to live and, um, how the world works and, uh,
what their place in it is. And, uh, they should probably write those ideas
down, because it's gonna be a lot easier to keep track of them and examine
them if they write them down. Um, and that they should see their philosophical
education as aiming at the production of this set of ideas, and then they
should try to live out those ideas in such a way that if, uh, somebody read
their autobiography, or sorry, their, their, their biography in a hundred
years, and no mention was made of these ideas, they'd be able to sort of
roughly, um, predict them. Um, and, uh, uh, so, uh, you know, where, where,
where the thought is that what a philosophy education is supposed to be
training you to do is produce and then live according to a conception of how
to live and, um, how to interact with the world and how to deal with it. Uh,
uh, uh, and, um, the, you know, m- maybe even it would be useful to tell
philosophy students this from the beginning, so that they could pick their
courses not willy-nilly, but according to what they think will help them do
this. Um, and we wanted to know what you thought of this. Uh, uh, uh, uh, I
don't mean to, to, to flatter you, but it occurred to me that you were, uh,
actually maybe a particularly good example of a person who, um, has a kind of
coherent system of ideas and then tries to live according to that. Um, though,
um-
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... you, you do so in such a way that makes you quite unusual, but-
Robin:
I'm weird. Okay, yes. We, we can just say it.
Agnes:
... yeah. So, so, uh, uh, uh, yeah, you seem like a good person to, to run
this idea by.
Robin:
It's, it's- so it's a good question, it's a good topic, and it's something
that, you know, certainly I think should be discussed more by other academics
and students more generally. Uh, I'm- you know, I might rephrase it in a way
that isn't just philosophy. I might say, all students could plausibly say,
"I've liked school. How could I continue something like this after school?" It
wouldn't have to be specific to philosophy-
Agnes:
Mm-hmm
Robin:
... but maybe there's a different answer for philosophy. And school presents
itself as something you should enjoy or, you know, be engaged by, so it's
something of a failing of school that it doesn't already have an answer for
this.
Agnes:
Yeah.
Robin:
It shouldn't be our job to come up with it. The entire institution is set up
to be inviting people into the world of school for a few years, and then it
should expect that some people might like that and it should have its standard
answer for what, what you could do if you wanted to continue, other than going
to grad school. That, that just seems like something all of academia should
have set up as a standard, uh, question and answer. So... And we, we shouldn't
wait till they ask us, we should take the initiative to say, "Okay, you guys,
you're graduating now. Here are- here's our standard answers about what you
might wanna do if you wanna continue this." And of course, that would benefit
us in the sense that some of that might be complementary to the things we're
doing. That is, you know, we like people to come to grad school, but even if
they don't come to grad school, they could be doing things that are
complementary to and supporting the rest of what we're doing f- from full-time
people. So this is just maybe the relationship between amateurs and
professionals.
Agnes:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
In many fields, you can find a productive way to inspire amateurs that will
help professionals, and that both of them together can be pursuing some
shared, you know, venture.
Agnes:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
Um, so, uh, you, you're proposing a thing specific for philosophy, which could
work for philosophy, but it isn't what philosophy is set up to do now. So as
you say, you might need to change how philosophy is done now if this is going
to be the continuation, 'cause it's not actually the continuation of what
they're doing now. The simpler answer would be to find a way to let them
continue what they're doing now as an undergraduate in philosophy, uh, i-
farther on outside. Uh, but that, you know, it does raise the question of,
what is it that they are most essentially doing-
Agnes:
Mm-hmm
Robin:
... that they would be motivated to continue, that they would enjoy
continuing? Uh, and presumably, what we're trying to do is not pre- at least
pretend that the whole point of this wasn't just to get a degree and get a
job.
Agnes:
Right.
Robin:
Right? That's one of the cynical answers here, is the reason we aren't doing
this, and we don't do it, is everybody kinda knows, well, the whole point is
just to graduate and get a job, and after that, once you get the job, you can
pretend you cared about anything here. You can stop pretending.
Agnes:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
Right.
Agnes:
Right.
Robin:
But those of us who, you know, went on to grad school or whatever, we, we, we
think we're not just pretending, that there's something valuable here that we
enjoy and that we wanna continue with. And so yes, there should be a story of
what that would be. Um, but I'm, I'm, I'm more tempted to think of minimal
variations that could satisfy these constraints, as opposed to maybe most
ambitious or most inspiring versions. I might just say-
Agnes:
Mm
Robin:
... well, let's look at what people actually do in school, that they actually
enjoy and motivates them, and find a way for that to continue in a, you know,
feasible way in the rest of their lives. And if there are other more ambitious
versions you can layer on to that, great, but I wouldn't start with that.
Like, having a whole life philosophy seems to me something that most, even
grad students or professors don't have.
Agnes:
Yeah.
Robin:
Certainly, most philosophy undergraduates don't have it, so making that the
standard of what you should try to do once you've left school and now you have
all sorts of other distractions, seems like a pretty high bar that's just
gonna lead to disappointment, 'cause most of them aren't gonna have the time
or energy to do it. Uh, but if, if, if you wanted to say, what was... You
know, what's the most obvious thing that... Look, if they're saying, "I've
enjoyed this, I wanna continue," the, the place to start is, "Well, what about
this have you enjoyed? What about this has motivated you and engaged you that
you would wanna continue?" Seems to me the most obvious candidate there is to
just continue to explore areas and learn more about them. You know, I mean,
there, there'd be two kinds of things. One is just to learn, the other is to
contribute, so that, that would be the two main distinctions in academia.
Agnes:
Mm.
Robin:
Many people just wanna continue to, to read and learn after they... And you
know, for most undergraduates, they didn't actually contribute, they were
mostly learning, and that would be a fine thing from them. They could have
reading groups or write their own essays or whatever. I don't think it's that
hard of a problem to imagine them grading them with each other or having some
outside source that could grade essays they wrote, test them on things. If
they wanted to do that, that would certainly be feasible. I don't know how
much they want, but that would be feasible, if that's what actually is
engaging them now. Um-
Agnes:
Mm-hmm. So you're making me realize that there's something behind this
question, um, which is- which says something like, "I've enjoyed this, and I
think it's good for me, and I want to continue it, but I don't think that I'm
sufficiently motivated to do it on my own." That is, the, the kind of added
incentives provided by the credential and the classroom and whatever, were
important to me. And so it's not the fully cynical reading, which says all
they ever wanted was the credential, but it's also not the fully idealistic
reading, which is just to say, "Oh, they love learning for learning's sake."
In effect, if that were true, they wouldn't be coming to you with this
question. They could, you know, just, um, like, like, think about
philosophical ideas or read books or whatever, right? Um, um, it seems like
there's a lot of different possibilities for how to do this if you are
independently motivated. Um, so I think one issue is that they are... And
that's why I've proposed, like, the group- the reading group, because I think
people can keep each other motivated. They want a community-... to do this
together. That's, a- a- and, and, and just they have a problem with
motivation. And the other issue is they want it to f- and these are related,
they want to feel like it's going somewhere. Um, so it's like just learning
more, um, um, feels, um, kind of v- um, fuzzy in terms of what it is that
you're doing and whether you're succeeding or failing. Um, and, um, they want
to be moving towards something that will be the culmination of it. I don't
think that necessarily has to be a matter of contributing to scholarly
literature, but that is an easy, you know, um, answer to that, but it- it's
not gonna work for most people. Um, I will note that undergraduates these
days, more and more, are demanding... Or not demanding, that's too strong a
word, but they- they're asking to, um, be part of research. E- every week, I
get a request from an undergraduate saying something like... I literally got
one this week: "My roommate is, like, participating in, you know, bi- bio
research, 'cause she's, like, helping out at some lab or whatever, and I- I'm
jealous. I'm a philosophy major. I want to participate in philosophy research.
How can I be, like, a research assistant to a philosopher?" And so they want
to be contributing in that way. Um, it's a kind of a, um, uh... Unfortunately,
that's not a thing in philosophy. There's not really a thing you can do-
Robin:
It's very hard to figure out how to-
Agnes:
To-
Arnold:
Right.
Agnes:
It's hard to figure out how to make use of a person in that way. Um, but so,
so these are the- actually, already the, the students, while they are
students, have this idea of contributing, that doesn't really map onto the way
philosophy works. Okay.
Robin:
But, but few of them actually do much research as undergraduates. So if there,
if there's this thing they hope to continue, and they're afraid of losing it,
it isn't research-
Agnes:
Right
Robin:
... 'cause they're not doing that.
Agnes:
So they would like to do the research, but yes-
Robin:
Right
Agnes:
... you're right that-
Robin:
Okay.
Agnes:
Yeah.
Robin:
But, but if the thing is learning that they've been doing, and that, and
that's the most obvious thing they would continue to enjoy doing if they were
to continue it, 'cause that's what they've mainly been doing, right? They- if
they say, "I've been enjoying this, I'm mean- this is meaningful, I wanna
continue," that's the thing they are saying they have found valuable and
meaningful. So i- I think it would be more... So, like, my wife does OLLI,
where these are sort of retirement classes. So there's whole schools where
retirees go take classes. And they sit in classes, and they talk, they read
things together, but the main thing they don't do is assignments and grading.
But apparently, that is the form that actually happens in the world. So that
might suggest that even new undergraduates might like that format, too, uh,
where they read things together and get guidance in the discussion, but don't
produce something or get graded. Um, I mean, I don't... I mean, it's about
what, in fact, is most motivating and engaging and interesting about the
classes they've had that they wanna continue, and apparently, that, that
format suggests the grading, the assignments and grading are not the thing
they most wanna do.
Agnes:
Though i- is it that they have the option of, uh, the assignment and grading
classes, and they just choose not to take those, or is it that nobody has
tried? Maybe they would like... Maybe your wife would like it even better if
there was one with assignments and grading, but that's just not on offer
because the people that they can get to teach these things don't wanna do that
much work.
Robin:
I, I think this is reflecting some market demand here. I don't think this is
just an arbitrary thing. This- you know, they, they've had these classes for
many years on a wide range of contexts, so there's something to learn here.
But it might be that undergraduates just have a different stance toward this
than retirees-
Agnes:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
... and they would be willing and interested to do more. Um, so I mean, the
simplest thing is just they continue a class, but that's time-consuming, I
guess. A- as you say, if they got together as a reading group... Uh, so I
remember, as I was a early young professional out of school, I very much
enjoyed reading groups, where we would get together and read a somewhat
academic book and discuss it together, and that was a way that many sort of
people with intellectual ambitions and inclinations, who weren't in school but
enjoyed it, could, um, continue to be intellectual.
Arnold:
Yeah, I mean, I guess, I guess, to pick up on Agnes' sort of second question
from a minute ago, um, I, I think part of what I'm worried about is, uh, uh,
the question, like, what is it that's giving structure to this activity? Um,
because I think that the, um, um... w- they can continue... So, so, you know,
I, w- when I, when I was trying to lay this problem out, I said, one of the
constraints on the problem is not just to provide them with an activity that,
you know, that they enjoyed from their undergraduate days, but to give them
something like a, um, uh, uh, uh, something that, that, that would structure
their time, right? So something that, uh, uh, is something like the direction
that this activity is supposed to be guided by. Um, and then, uh, uh, the, the
slightly strange suggestion that I came up with, I think, is th- that, one,
come up with something like a coherent conception of, you know, d- your life
and, um, what you're supposed to do, and how you're supposed to relate to the
world, and what's going on in the world, um, is just that... I think
ostensibly, that is what philosophy is supposed to actually produce. That is,
it's supposed to produce people who live according to an idea, rather than-
Robin:
But that's not what you're actually producing.
Arnold:
Yeah. That's true. Um-
Robin:
Neither as professionals, nor as undergraduates, nor as grad students, none of
you are producing that, so that just, uh-
Arnold:
Well-
Robin:
... seems a non-starter as the thing they should be trying to do-... to
continue what they've enjoyed.
Arnold:
I, I, I think if you look at philosophy research, um, um, and then ask, "What
is this all driving towards?" I think plausibly it is driving towards
something like, um, um, the set of ideas that people could live by. And then,
uh, it's, it's mostly driven by, you know, I've published this paper, and
you've got some critique of it, and so you're gonna publish your- another
paper, and then I wanna object to your critique, and so I'm gonna publish
another paper, and stuff like that. But then i- if we sort of ask, like, what
is it that all of this research is supposed to be adding up to in the way that
physics research is supposed to be adding up to eventually a coherent and
correct conception of nature? Um, it would be something like this. It would be
a coherent, and, um, correct, and widely distributable conception of, uh, how
a human being should live and what their place in the universe is.
Robin:
Let me propose a generality that encompasses this and the two examples you
gave.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Robin:
You say, "Physicists should have a conception of nature. Philosophers should
have a, you know, guide to life." But on reflection of what happened to me at
that stage of life and what I've seen other people do, I see two main
activities. Um, one is that people like to get together, reading a book and
discussing it, because they want to form an opinion on the topic of the book,
say, and that's the thing that motivates them to suggest a book, and to read
it, and then to remember it. A part of what-
Arnold:
Mm-hmm
Robin:
... their life experience is, is to have slowly accumulate more opinions on
big, important topics by having read books that take opinions on- take stances
on those topics, and they either are for or against it. And then those
opinions could be for a great many purposes but that's a shared thing that
happens at- across a wide range of people at that stage in their life, is they
want to read and discuss things in order to form their own opinion on the
question. So those could be about how to live your life or about the nature-
structure of nature, and, you know, various purposes can be encompassed
through that particular activity. And then the other activity I see that's
related is, when they are motivated enough by thinking about things and
forming their opinion, they want to write down their opinion, and they write
blog posts or essays and things like that, and that's the- that, that fewer
people do that, but that seems to me the obvious next step. And then some of
those people decide to go back to school, grad school, or to write a blog,
and, and have many opinions. But-
Arnold:
Mm-hmm
Robin:
... that, that seems to me the thing that motivates people, is to have a
quest- a topic that's, you know, where different opinions are possible. And
then what they do repeatedly is read or discuss the topic, form an opinion,
then debate that opinion with other people. But the things they've accumulated
over time are their opinions on those topics, and then they may well write
more and, and enter the world of intellectuals by writing those opinions. But
I think it's not so much they just want to join the world of intellectuals,
it's more o- more often, in my view, that they have so many opinions, and
they're so eager to get those opinions engaged and become part of the world
that, you know, generates and manages those opinions, that that's why they
want to come join. They want to be part of the world that generates and, eh,
evaluates, and those opinions. That- that's what I remember, and the people
around me, but maybe that's just me.
Arnold:
Mm.
Robin:
You can tell me that somebody else is different.
Agnes:
I think that, um, they... When they say, "What do I do next?" They don't just
mean, um, "How do I keep doing the exact thing I've been doing in college?"
They mean, "What comes next? Like, what- what's the next step? How do I level
up?" But not grad school. Um, so I, I guess I think that they wouldn't really
be satisfied if you were like, "Oh, you could just take evening classes on
Kant or whatever." They're like, "No, I've done that. Um, I wanna know, like,
I'm, I'm really interested in this philosophy thing. I'm- you know, I've done,
like, I've done my four years, I've gotten this education. What comes next?
What's the next step?" And that's partly why the reading group thing is a bit
unsatisfying because it sounds a little bit too much like, um, just keep to...
How to keep doing what you were doing before. Um, and where- and the thing
you're now proposing, which is like, well, maybe you would form these opinions
and then write them, that would at least satisfy this, uh, this concern about,
if there's supposed to be something that comes next. But I also think that
maybe a difference, where people who are interested in philosophy, and this
isn't all, but it's maybe half. Um, it's not that there is some topic, and
they would like to form an opinion on the topic, and so they find a book that
says something on that topic, and they're gonna decide whether they agree or
disagree with the book. It's like, "I really wanna know how Heidegger thinks.
I really wanna get Kant. I really wanna be able to think like Kierkegaard."
Um, that is, there are these great thinkers in the history of time that are
somewhat mysterious and opaque, and they wanna kind of work their way into
those minds, and that's a big part of their motivation, and it's not just
like, "I wanna figure out whether Heidegger was right or wrong." That question
pretty much doesn't arise. It's pretty much irrelevant to the study of
Heidegger.
Robin:
But the people in your world, who are the people that otherwise go to, as
those people really get Heidegger, the way they achieve that and demonstrate
is by writing essays on Heidegger, right? Essays about particular-
Agnes:
Not on whether he's right or wrong.
Robin:
No, but about particular aspects of Heidegger's thoughts.
Agnes:
Yeah.
Robin:
They- they... Those essays will have a thesis. They will disagree with other
theses. That's what I mean by having an opinion. So the, the idea of
generating an opinion and, and then writing to defend it, fits into the
framework of wanting to really understand Heidegger. It's just a different set
of opinions, isn't it?
Agnes:
... Right, so I, I'm actually kind of, Arnold gave an answer, and then you're
like, "No, no, that's a terrible answer because it's too different from what
they were doing."
Robin:
That's terrible.
Agnes:
And then, I'm just translating from Robin-ese- -to normal-ese. And then, uh,
and then you propose this thing, which is basically Arnold's answer again, um,
as far as I can tell. Namely, what Arnold said is, um, you know, use
philosophy to produce a bunch of opinions. Now, uh, the way I would paraphrase
it is a manifesto, okay? He was saying, "Get- write a manifesto." Um, uh, the,
the difference maybe with what you're saying is, you weren't putting a
constraint on the set of opinions, namely, that they all fit together. Um, but
clearly that's desirable, right? As a, as a bonus. That'd be a nice bonus if
the opinions fit together. Um, but I think that y- your thought, which is
produce a bunch of opinions, and Arnold's thought, which is produce a bunch of
opinions that fit together, um, are not very far from each other. Kind of
seems like you're just making his proposal, but in a slightly weaker version.
Robin:
But I meant to focus on this difference as, as a key obstacle. That is-
Agnes:
Mm
Robin:
... people who are going to make a manifesto of their views, uh, they often
actually go wrong. That is, there's actually a bunch of different ways that
amateur intellectuals go wrong. A- and one of them is to generate their own
manifesto about physics and engineering, and all sorts of... economics, and
all sorts of things. As opposed-
Agnes:
I, I am gonna say that I, I receive many manifestos-
Robin:
Mm-hmm,
Agnes:
-in email form, and not one has ever been of interest to me.
Arnold:
Yeah. So, so I, I, I get these, too. Um, my favorite is a long series of
manifestos that I've been getting from this one guy, who a- as far as I can
tell, essentially claims that all historical people are John the Baptist. Um,
and-
Robin:
Okay
Arnold:
... that, that they're all one guy, and like-
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... all the works of Plato and Aristotle, and all the works of, you know,
whatever, Shakespeare even. And it, it's just... Uh, uh, but, uh, I guess, I
guess the thing to say in defense of these manifesto writers is, um, they're
doing very badly what in some sense I think people just ought to be doing,
which is, um, um, coming up with, uh, a, a sense of how they should live their
lives that's theirs. And that, that if philosophy has an end, how could it be
anything but that? Um, and presumably, it, it's not just that we want people
to write manifestos. People are terrible at that, as you, as you observe. Um,
and the things that they say, especially when they start getting into things
like physics, are just, um, wildly wrong, and probably an impediment to their
learning anything about it.
Robin:
Right.
Arnold:
But it's like, but that's why we're supposed to educate them. I mean, it, it-
Robin:
But, but what, what does education consist of? Uh, I would say that a big
central element of education that is the thing that makes people not go off on
the manifesto failure mode is the idea that instead of thinking through some
topic for yourself in many different details and finding an integrated
version, you should look for minor modifications of what other people have
said. That's the main thing education does.
Arnold:
Right.
Robin:
It makes you read what other people said, respond to what they've ever said,
and maybe disagree, but only with minor modifications what other people said.
It pul- pulls you into this shared knowledge that we have, and-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... to try to help build that up, rather than go construct your own separate
things.
Arnold:
Yeah. So, so when I imagine the utopia in which everybody does this, makes-
follows my suggestion, I don't imagine a bunch of people coming up with their
own ethical theories. I imagine these manifestos often consisting of something
like, "Look, here's my understanding of, say, Kant's deontological ethics,
and, um, here are some contemporary debates about it, and they're worried
about these issues, and, um, here's my take on it. Uh, and, uh, so I'm a
Kantian with the following minorific, you know, modifications, um, in order to
incorporate these critiques." And that, that what a well-educated manifesto
would look like, I think, is largely, um, a modification of the best views
that we've produced as a-
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... community of intellectuals.
Robin:
But the way to get people to do that, to avoid the mistake mode, is to have
them for a while not try to make a manifesto, but just slowly, you know,
decide which of the opinions exist that, that they agree with, and then making
minor modifications to those and defending them-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... and then only much later trying to make an integrated manifesto. It's just
a mistake too early on to try to make manifestos.
Arnold:
Yeah, yeah.
Robin:
So telling them that you should right now, that you're out of college, go
generate your own integrated theory of everything, is just a mistake.
Agnes:
Basically, what you're saying is, college, it's just, it's too... We, you
know, we, we have elementary school, we have high school, we have college.
What we really need is more education, maybe like eight more years- -after
college before people go work. Um, because we, we don't wanna s- you know, set
them off-
Arnold:
Yeah
Agnes:
... uh-
Arnold:
I, I guess I'm wondering maybe if, if what you're saying, effectively, is we
just need to be doing a much better job educating people, such that they
get... They're gonna be ready for their manifesto writing after four years. I
mean, what, what, what excuse do we have for they get out of college, they get
out of a four-year philosophy degree, and they're still not able to write a
manifesto in a reasonable, intelligent, coherent way?
Robin:
Maybe they should spend their last year on failed attempts at manifestos,
where you slap them every time they go wrong.
Arnold:
Yeah, yeah.
Robin:
'Cause you're not practicing.
Agnes:
Instead of the BA thesis.
Arnold:
Yeah, they have to do a manifesto, BA manifesto.
Robin:
Right.
Arnold:
Um-
Robin:
I mean, the, the idea would be to push them to be a little more general and to
go a little farther away from what they have in their essays from their
student essays, but to help m- help them manage the ways that can go terribly
wrong. And the only way to do that is to have them try to be a little more
general, a little farther away from what they've written, and then try to show
them how, you know, how to do that.
Arnold:
Right.
Robin:
That is, there might not be a way-... just maybe student essays have just not
been ambitious enough in college.
Arnold:
Right. Right.
Robin:
And they need to try to have more ambitious essays with larger topics and
bigger claims and themes, but they need to do that under supervision so that
they just don't do the manifesto thing, the, the-
Arnold:
Right
Robin:
... usual failed manifesto thing.
Arnold:
Right. It's, it's that students are encouraged to write essays about
philosophy, even graduate students, even professors, most of the time, are
encouraged to write essays about philosophy, but they're generally dissuaded
and kept away from the practice of writing essays of philosophy. And I guess
maybe my suggestion is something like, um, if we try to think about what
students- how students should, you know, try to live a philosophical life
after their degrees, you know, um, setting graduate school and stuff aside,
um, that they should be engaging in philosophy and doing works of philosophy.
We don't train them for that. We, we train them to write about it, but we
don't train them to try to do it. We don't try to train them to try to-
Robin:
And you, you do train them to do it as grad students, to some extent.
Arnold:
Mostly, we train them to write essays about other essays. And I-
Robin:
Okay
Arnold:
... maybe that's not what we're talking about.
Robin:
But some grad students try to write philosophy, right? At, at least that's a
point where if they tried to do it, you would be willing to help them, and
that would be within-
Arnold:
Yeah, yeah
Robin:
... the scope of things they're allowed to do, right?
Arnold:
Yeah. But I'd, I'd say maybe, what, 20% at most of graduate students end up
doing something like that.
Agnes:
I mean, I think that even if they did that, they would have to engage the
literature, and that that's primarily what philosophical discourse is, is
finding a sort of conversation where there's a bunch of people, and you're
saying which ones you agree with and which ones you disagree with, and why.
Most importantly, the second thing.
Robin:
Right. But so maybe the key thing is you should have some classes in
undergraduate where they do that, where their job is-
Agnes:
But they are doing that, that is, in, in papers they are doing that.
Robin:
I-
Agnes:
Um-
Arnold:
Well, I, I think the problem is that they're not doing that with an eye to the
significance for them of the manifesto.
Agnes:
Mm.
Arnold:
Right? It's just targets of opportunity, where- wherever you can make some
kind of intellectual comment-
Agnes:
Right.
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... you make the, make the comment. But it should be guided by this thought
that, "This has to contribute in some way to my manifesto."
Agnes:
Mm.
Arnold:
I'm not even sure that human beings are supposed to write these even by the-
Robin:
Do not... Just do not use the word manifesto in whatever you actually expect
them to do. But I think the idea might be, okay, like independent reading or
something. Instead of, "Here's a class with a syllabus and assignments, and
you should do it," like you say, "Okay, you should now pick your own question-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... it's something you care about."
Agnes:
That's the BA thesis.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Agnes:
Um-
Robin:
But, but they should maybe not just one, maybe they should be writing many
small BA thesis-like essays earlier in the process. They should, you know,
have classes where they start... The po- point is not to have write a
commentary on the reading you gave them, but more fundamentally, to just take
a position on an interesting question, and-
Arnold:
Right
Robin:
... help them practice that.
Arnold:
So, so maybe something like an, what, extradition to ethics, where they write,
like, the final paper is, um, come up with a correct ethical theory, and they
have to do their best to modify some existing-
Robin:
Well, that, that's again, I would think that's too much. Just make a, an
ethical claim that you think is interesting and valuable, and defend it. But
it sh- doesn't have to be, you know, responding to a very particular thing you
read by somebody else. It could be, but to say, "You know, what do you think
is interesting and important? Think about it, make a claim, defend it." And
let them, in a supervised context, learn how to do that.
Arnold:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
Don't call it a manifesto, and don't make them think it should be-
Arnold:
Right
Robin:
... a big question that integrates lots of things.
Arnold:
Right.
Robin:
Initially, think, you know, a small question, like, "Should I go to a wedding
when I think I don't like the purple?" or something, right? Just some
practice, maybe a, an concrete question in their lives around them.
Arnold:
Yeah. Though, something that I'd want them to have some experience with is
trying to, um, uh, uh, uh, build a theory that is a, a, you know, so-
Robin:
The theory maybe would integrate many pieces. First, just make them argue for
the pieces, and then when they have a couple of pieces, then you could say,
"Maybe it's now time to try to put your pieces together into something
bigger."
Arnold:
I'm, I'm worried that that's a skill that needs special attention in, in
somebody's training. That is the-
Robin:
Yes, but that's why if, if they try it without the attention- training, it's
gonna go very badly.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Agnes:
So, like, I think that, um, um, everyone thinks that they are living in
accordance with ideas that are their own ideas. That is, um, at least everyone
I've ever met. Um, and, um, this could be a bit of a selection point, but, um,
they think that, like, they're making choices about their own lives, and those
choices reflect their values and their kind of integrated outlook on life and
on what's important. And, um, one thing that the study of philosophy reveals
is that's not true. Um, what they're in fact doing is just copying the people
around them, and that their so-called system of ideas is riddled with
contradictions, crucial vague points, undefined terms, et cetera. And the
thing they thought was a theoretical structure that was holding up their lives
was, like, just a bunch of spaghetti or something. And I think that, um, um,
that, that should have some kind of payoff, is what Arnold is saying. That
is-... It should be that if you have a philosophical education, then you're in
at least a somewhat better position than the average person to live in
accordance with a set of ideas that are your own ideas, that you've examined,
that are such that if somebody asks you, "Wait, how does this relate to this
other part?" You're not just like, "Why should any of it relate?" or
something. You, you, you feel beholden to that kind of consistency. So it
makes sense to me that this would be a kind of, um, this should be a benefit
that we're providing.
Robin:
I mean, this isn't what you're doing now, but it sounds like a fun exercise
where you take undergraduates and you say, "Okay, what we're gonna do now is,
you need to take a bunch of ethical positions or personal positions on a bunch
of topics. You're gonna need to write those down, and now w- the rest of your
classmates here are gonna attack the coherence of that."
Agnes:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
"They're gonna say how that doesn't fit together, and then you're gonna need
to defend the coherence of these things. And then maybe you should modify them
as the way to defend the coherence. Maybe we'll find that it isn't working.
You will... In this ex- class or exercise, you will slowly make your set of
positions more coherent with each other." That's what this whole thing is
about. That it could be, you know, a context, a class, or whatever it is,
where the task is to make a more coherent set of positions toward-
Agnes:
Well, I-
Robin:
... life.
Agnes:
I think it's not quite right to say that that's not what we're already doing.
If I just think about what I did this week in my philosophy class, we, uh...
we're examining the claim, everyone desires the good. That is, is it true that
everyone is always motivated to achieve the good in everything that they do
and in everything that they want? And then, um, uh, here's the first kind of
realization that we came to is, that claim is actually ambiguous between two
versions of it, namely, everyone desires what they take to be good, and
everyone desires what really is good. That's already progress, right? Because
none of them had ever noticed that there-
Robin:
Right
Agnes:
... were these two interpretations, and they would just say, "Oh, everyone
desires what's good."
Robin:
Right, right.
Agnes:
And they wouldn't even notice that there's this crucial ambiguity. Now, once I
put the... Once I disambiguated in that way, they were all inclined to say,
"Well, everyone desires what they believe to be good." That's the plausible
version, right?
Robin:
Right.
Agnes:
And then I would sort of give them examples, like they... I would give- You
know, I was like: Sh- show me what's an example of something where somebody
desires something that they believe to be good, but it might not actually be
good. And they're like: Oh, someone might wanna insulate their house with
asbestos, but the asbestos is actually gonna give them lung cancer. And then
I'm like: "Well, is it the lung cancer that they desire? That's... 'Cause lung
cancer is bad, I'm gonna agree with you."
Robin:
Right.
Agnes:
"But is that what they desire? Do they desire this bad thing, lung cancer,
believing that lung cancer is good?" Like, no, no, no. They desire, um,
insulation. It's like, well, insulation is a good thing, right? So the thing
that they desire is a good thing. It's a thing we all agree is good. And then
there's a bad thing, lung cancer, and they didn't know they were getting that.
They didn't desire it, right? Okay, so the point is, I gave them a bunch of
examples, and I showed them how you could factor out the examples, and you
could show that the object of their desire in every case was a thing that we
would all agree is good. Um, and that now looks like an argument for the
stronger version of the thesis. No, everyone desires what really is good.
People only ever desire stuff that really is objectively, actually good. Um,
and that, that's a shock to them, right? They never thought that their, kind
of, basic intuitions sort of boiled down to that. Now, we could question the
argument, but the point is that they were coming with their own conceptions of
what, what motivation is, and we were talking about cases like depression,
being, feeling suicidal, et cetera. Can we construe those as desiring the
good? Um, and I think that what was happening in the class was that their sort
of pre-theoretical intuitions about human motivation that were... That have
been guiding them in their lives, were coming in for examination. So I, I
think that is the-
Robin:
But-
Agnes:
... this activity
Robin:
... what you're describing is the evolution of people's concepts over time,
which certainly is happening in, through the undergraduate world. People come
with a set of concepts, and then they, and leave with a different set of
concepts that are more carefully honed and made clear and related to each
other. But a set of concepts is different than a plan of action or philosophy
of life, or set of opinions on ethics or something. That's what I thought
Arnold was more hoping that people would generate. Uh, but you, you could just
say, "I just want a more coherent set of concepts in my head," and that's a
different sort of, uh, ambition. But still, I, I still think your students
acquired that one little edit to their concepts, and they are slowly getting
many little edits to their concepts. But that's different than saying, "Okay,
c- I can describe my set of concepts ," and, you know, put 20 of them on paper
and show how they relate to each other and, and make claims about the
relationships. That's an attempt to a larger scape- scope of coherence, which
you could do for concepts, or you could do for opinions about politics or
morals, or you could do for a wide range of other topic areas. I don't... I
mean, that's-- You were saying that's something you thought people wanted and
they would be motivated by, and if so, you could have more exercises where
people do the work of trying to make a set of things coherent.
Arnold:
Yeah, I mean, uh, so, uh, you know, just speaking about the history of the
education in philosophy, philosophy is maybe the first thing, um, uh, uh,
where we have, have the idea of an education, like a, uh, a non-skills
education coming up, um, is, is in these early philosophical schools. Um, and,
uh, uh, you know, so, so, so as one good example of the way that philosophical
education, um, was very different from the way we do it in the modern period
is, uh, in Descartes's day. He... You know, D- Descartes wrote, um, his
Principles of Philosophy largely as an alternative educational system. So he,
he, he was thinking that this is the new textbook that everybody would get in
their Paris universities, um, if, if his, if his attempts were successful. And
what it would do is, it, it would replace, um, you know, say, Suarezian
Scholastic metaphysics as the-... dominant regime. But in, it was a, it was a
com- competition between two comprehensive theories that were taught to
students as philosophy. And, um, Descartes' comprehensive theory, um, you
know, like Lucretius before him, like maybe Aristotle, like maybe, uh, maybe
to a much lesser extent, Plato, was a total conception of the world, of human
beings, their place in it, and how they should live. And, um, this was just
understood to be what it meant to be educated in philosophy, was to be given
this sort of thing. And now we're in a period where, um, uh, I think, to our
benefit, um, we no longer think there's, like, one idea that we should be
teaching all of our students. We no longer teach them dogmatic metaphysics or
dogmatic ethics or anything like that. We teach them this wide array of stuff.
But I, I... And, and then maybe what we're seeing with this question that
students ask us, like, "What's this all supposed to add up to at the end of
the philosophy degree, um, other than a career in a very difficult part of
academia?" Um, is, is we've, we've swung pretty hard in this other direction,
where there's so little sense that this coheres or that there's something
right about what we're doing, or this is supposed to fit together into
something. That, um, uh, uh, uh... Because w- we're sort of just teaching them
stuff willy-nilly, where like, "Here's this big pot of classes. You'll learn
some distinctions over here, you'll learn some history over there, you'll
learn some really interesting niceties about the philosophy of language over
here." And, uh, they never get any sense that this is supposed to add up to
something. Um, and, and then I, I guess the question is just, like, like maybe
one response, and, and maybe I detected this in your responses earlier, is
philosophy shouldn't be doing that. Um, when it does attempt to do that, like
Descartes did, it ends up making all sorts of terrible mistakes and leading
people astray, and that it should be less coherent. It should be less
comprehensive, it should be more thing- doing things like distinction training
and stuff like that. Um, but yeah, I, I, I guess, I guess one way to put it is
just we have this historical mode of doing philosophy and teaching it, and
we've swung very, very hard in the other direction. And at this point, it, it
feels a little like, um, uh, uh, it, it doesn't add up to something as an
education.
Robin:
So this is a very, to me, a rather different question than the one you started
with.
Arnold:
Mm.
Robin:
But it's related. So, I mean, there's the question of, "I'm an undergraduate.
I've just finished. I kinda like it. What can I keep doing to be continuing
this rather than dropping it all?" That's somewhat different to the question
of, what's a coherent claim for what education gives you, such that, uh, you
can say at the end, "Here, we gave it to you, uh, and here's how you're gonna
use it, and, you know, good job"?
Arnold:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
Edu- academia less does that.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Robin:
Right? Uh, one version, of course, is that, that, you know, you won't get a
good job unless you do this, and so you better do this to get a good job. And
a related version is, if you wanna be part of, you know, research, you'll have
to do this and then do more to be part of the research world. For if you wanna
be part of the research world, then, you know, y- you'll have to come up with
your own motivation for that, management of knowledge. And you might think...
I was hoping there was an, a third rationale to be offering people for why
they should be educated, and that we could show that we had achieved it.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Robin:
And that does seem to be something like, you get to think clearer about many
things.
Arnold:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
But that's kinda hard to show on any particular thing. Uh, it would certainly
be a way to show it if you say, "Well, here's my integrated system for
everything-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... and see how it works all together," and that would be a way to show that
you were thinking more clearly, 'cause hey, you've got a system. But nobody
has that now, much less undergraduates a year after they graduate.
Arnold:
Well, so there I a little bit disagree with you, and I think that this is why
I brought you up as a counterexample. That is, I, um, I'm quite good, um... I
believe, I guess maybe it's worth testing this. But I, I think I'm quite good
at thinking, "What would Robin think about this?" Um, I, I can rarely predict
your detailed views about topics you know more about-
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... than I do, but, but I can, I can sort of get a Robinsonian reaction, I
think, with some reliability. Uh, you can tell me if you think that's true.
Agnes:
I haven't tested it.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Robin:
Okay.
Agnes:
I can tell- I can say that he believes he does.
Robin:
Yeah. Right.
Agnes:
'Cause he often will say-
Robin:
No, but-
Agnes:
"This is what Robin would say."
Robin:
I mean, I, I think what you're probably l- just seeing is, to a first cut, the
fact that I'm a polymath, and a polymath is a person who studies many areas
and then tries to fit them together to have-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... views that make their views in the different areas all fit together. And
that will stand out differently to somebody who just knows one particular area
as an academic, and then all their other opinions are just the usual sort of-
Arnold:
Right
Robin:
... public opinions on things. Um-
Arnold:
And, and you, you haven't written a manifesto. Uh, maybe that, that's not
really necessary. Um, but nevertheless, there is sort of a way you approach
problems, a way that you, um, um, you know, handle decisions and, and so on.
And that's more or less identifiable. Um, uh, in, in, for example, in the case
of Aristotle, as an Aristotle scholar, I, I work backwards from something like
a giant manifesto to the way that Aristotle thinks. And so when people, as
they frequently do, students ask me questions, "What would Aristotle think
about this?" Where this is something that he never wrote about, like
artificial limbs or, you know, AI or something. Um, I can give what I think
are pretty reasonable answers. That is, I can say, "You know, these are the
kinds of tools that he would bring into the question, and this is sort of how
we'd try to think about it." Um, and, uh, I-... uh, so I, I, I, I don't know
that, like, a document is the key thing here, but it's something like having a
coherent way that you do things intellectually.
Robin:
Well, let's not make it binary. Make it a continuum, a degree of coherence.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Robin:
Then I think you could say one of the great virtues of an education in general
is that you will just be more coherent. That is-
Arnold:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
Look, so, like, it's a standard result in politics that when you ask ordinary
people their opinions on various policy questions, the answers you get are
just pretty random relative to each other. And as you get more educated
people, the answers are more coherent. They more fit together across topics.
Arnold:
Right.
Robin:
That's a virtue of education, is that your answers across diverse nearby
topics will actually be related to each other, have co- connections, really,
coherence. And you might just say, "Yes, coherence is a virtue." It's a
practical-
Arnold:
Mm-hmm
Robin:
... virtue, but it, it's a virtue, but it's not a thing you acquire with a
manifesto. It's a thing that takes a lifetime to get better at, and you never
get fully coherent. But yes, let's call it a virtue. Let's call it the goal,
and to say, if, if you wanna c- what you've been doing here in school is
becoming more coherent, and what you'd like to continue to do is to come- be-
continue to become more coherent. And then the way to do that is to look at
view- look at... you know, read about things, think about them, that are
adjacent to each other, and then notice conflicts between adjacent opinions,
and try to resolve them. That's-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... what produces coherence. You know, it's a local production of a degree of
coherence.
Arnold:
But, but-
Robin:
But that is a great virtue, and it's a good thing for people to be doing. And
our world maybe just needs, I don't know, just a way to have a Nobel Prize of
a coherence or something, just a way to- P- people aren't even rated on
coherence. We don't score-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... students on their coherence. We don't, we don't, uh, you know, have prizes
for most coherent. We don't even talk so much about a person's coherence of
their views, per se.
Arnold:
Yeah.
Robin:
Uh, maybe we should just be highlighting that as a feature and a virtue.
Arnold:
But I, I, I wanna add something to the idea of coherence or maybe just point
something out a- about the idea, which is that, like, we can imagine two
people. Um, Tom and Jerry both have entirely coherent or maximally coherent
beliefs, or at least to the same degree, coherent beliefs. Um, um, in the case
of Tom's case, this is just a lucky accident. He's a bit of an idiot, but he
so happens to have wandered into a set of beliefs that all just kind of fit
together. Um-
Robin:
Right, there are such things, like libertarian policy, like, you, you just
have a very consistent set of beliefs across a wide range of things, if you
just pick some simple axioms and boom-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... consistently follow the axioms through. There you go.
Arnold:
Well, well, now, now it sounds like you might be talking a little more about
Jerry. Jerry is somebody who- ... has thought through all of his beliefs from
a set of principles that, um, he, he, you know, has some good reasons for
adopting, and they're, uh... as a result of his efforts to think through his
ideas, they're coherent. So maybe, um, uh, uh, Jerry's a libertarian. Tom has
all the same views as a libertarian, but just because, um, the people around
him mention these things to him, and he, he gets them off Twitter or
something-
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... but he, he's never really put them together or tried to think about it, or
he doesn't understand the order that they come in, or that there are any
principles-
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... and versus theorems. He just sort of has adopted them.
Robin:
But, I mean-
Arnold:
And so we don't want... Like, like, the, the idea is not that there are a
bunch of people like Tom around. It's that there are a bunch of people who
have coherent beliefs because they have put them together.
Robin:
But if you ask this first person adjacent questions near the set of consistent
beliefs they have, they- those won't be coherent because they can't... There's
this vast space of adjacent opinions, whatever actual opinions they have so
far-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... and you will easily be able to tell their coherence by just asking them
adjacent questions. So I don't, I don't think it's that hard to test
coherence, whether it's systematic or accidental. Accidental just can't
survive a continued testing of adjacent issues.
Arnold:
Yeah, yeah. No, the issue isn't, isn't telling the difference exactly. It's,
it's more like, um, um, the thing that we want people to be when we want them
to be coherent isn't consistent with themselves over time, necessarily. It's
something more than that. It's something like to be, um, to have it be the
case that all their beliefs are the flowering of some really important core
set of beliefs, for which they have some really good reasons for holding or
something.
Robin:
We- But that's just the main way we know to produce coherence, that, that-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... in fact, when we try to be coherent, w- the main way we, we resolve that
is to try to find some pattern, abstract it to a principle, and then, you
know, eliminate the differences between our principle and the details. That's
the main way we ever get coherent. There, there is no other way.
Arnold:
Right. Right, right. So, so, um, um, um, but we are driving towards something
like an ability that a person has to think in a certain way, rather than just,
um, a kind of alignment of belief. And then, and then the question is: How do
we produce that ability?
Agnes:
Right, but now I'm starting to think, like, the manifesto, even if, um,
impractical in the sense of, um, you know, there are many failure modes, is a
thing that a person could coherently put together over, you know, the first 10
years of their lives after graduating. But the idea that what you're supposed
to develop is kind of a skill of thinking, um, that seems less... it less has
that, uh, teleological motivating structure, where there's something that
you're producing, that you can kind of hang onto as, um, the goal, the
completion of your activity. It's just like we'd all like to get better at
being more consistent, and you can keep working at it, and you can keep
getting better. That doesn't feel like a real answer.
Arnold:
Yeah, I agree that, that, that we- coherence would just be a necessary
condition. That is, we want coherence and, um, uh, uh, we want the, the ideas
to actually be good, too. But y- you might take that to be-... you know, an
extension of coherence with, like, perception and, and just normal encounters
with the world. It, it depends on whether or not you're a coherentist.
Agnes:
I, I, I feel like what these people are asking for, or one way to understand
what they're asking for, is, say I'm gonna do some philosophy stuff over the
course of the rest of my life, which might be just thinking on my own, it
might be having conversations at a dinner party, it might be reading books.
What should be my goal in those activities? What should I be aiming for? And I
still kind of think that maybe Arnold's answer is the only answer. That is,
you should be aiming for a, um, systematic, coherent, and complete account of
how to live, that you can also use to live. But maybe the right thing to say
is, um, you should be aiming for that in such a way that, like, on your
deathbed, you could write it down.
Arnold:
Mm.
Agnes:
Um, that is, don't write it down now, because we're working to that. Um, um,
but think of it as the thing that you're working towards, and there's a kind
of a nominal manifesto. Um, and that what you're trying to do is make your
life look more like it's idea-driven, which involves examining ideas. It does
involve clarifying concepts, but it also involves getting clear on substantive
questions and whatever, and that that's what you're working towards in your
philosophical activity.
Robin:
So I guess I notice the thing you're pointing to is a common goal people wanna
have, and it makes some sense, and I've always disagreed with it strongly, so
I just- I-
Arnold:
Mm
Robin:
... I wanna plant my flag about h- where I disagree. I see these people who
are gonna spend their whole life producing this coherent thought in their
head, and then when they die, it's this magnificent thing they've constructed,
and I go, "What a waste!" I want to be part of a world where we all together
build this thing that will take generations, which is the world understanding
things better, and I want to invite you to join me in that exercise. And for
that, what you should do is go find any part of their- our shared beliefs or
understanding, and help f- fix it and improve it. It's less about you having
this magical thing that you produce, and more about us together having a
shared consensus that we are going to s- slowly improve. And for that, yes,
you should be f- looking for sm- for what we have now and editing it. Now,
that doesn't mean you have to be a researcher or academic, per se, because
there's lots of topics on which we sort of have shared opinions that academics
hardly ever talk about. And so there's lots of openings for less formality,
things that couldn't be published in a journal, et cetera, for you to just
look at conventional wisdom or what people say and say, "Does that make sense?
Is that coherent and consistent with things nearby?" And help us edit our
shared understanding. But for that, you should just look for: what is the
usual opinion on something, what are the standard opinions, and ask, "Which of
those can you help improve?"
Arnold:
Yeah, the, the thing you just said is, is like something like an ethics, that
is something that might fill out a manifesto. Um, I, I, I, I guess what I'm
saying is, it... You, you can't object to the idea of, "Let's come up with a
way to live according to ideas," by saying, "Well, here are some ideas that
you should live according to. Now, let's try to figure out how the world works
using those ideas." It's like, that is an ethical theory that you're e-
espousing. I mean, it's, it's, it's-
Robin:
Right, but, but, but-
Arnold:
... in a certain way, communitarian. It's, uh, uh, uh, it, it's, you know,
philo-
Robin:
But I don't, I don't have the ambition to write it all out as a, you know,
document describing this coherent account. I think it's the sort of thing I
can quickly describe, point to roughly, and that we could have a shared
motivation of people who are trying to do it together.
Agnes:
But, um, it seems like if, you know, you have this goal of the world
understanding things better, that world is just composed of individuals who
have some understanding. And that project of the world understanding things
better only makes sense if the individuals inside that world are taking that
stuff up and, like, making use of the understanding, and then being like, "Oh,
this is awesome. I understand stuff." And, um, and so I think what Arnold is
sort of proposing is that you be one of those people who understands stuff and
gets the benefit. Um, um, that is, that this kind of, um, intellectual
advancement that the, um, professionals are producing not go to waste, that
there be somebody who consume it. Um, 'cause if nobody ever cared about living
their lives in accordance with any ideas-
Robin:
Right
Agnes:
... then, like, what are you doing producing the better ideas?
Robin:
But remember you talked about how most people are just copying other people
and not actually thinking this stuff through? And you might say, "That's good.
That's exactly how it should go." Most people should just copy what other
people do with rough rationales for it, and then some people should specialize
in working out those things more thoughtfully in particular areas. But nobody
should have a coherent view of everything. That's too hard. What you should
focus on is looking for areas where you could help the usual views on those
things, that everybody's habitually copying and not thinking about, more co-
more sensible, more informed, et cetera. That, that's the highest ambition, is
to take chunks of the thing we are habitually thinking and saying, and making
that make sense. And-
Arnold:
But that... I think this is why the distinction between Tom, the idiot, and
Jerry, the coherent thinker, is important. It's because y- you're, you're
suggesting here that, um, um, Tom, the guy whose beliefs just happen to be
consistent, is, um, is in fact a beneficiary of this big project. And then the
question is, is he?
Robin:
Right.
Arnold:
... right? It, it, is there any, anything really worthwhile in having a bunch
of aligned beliefs, as opposed to being the one who aligns them on the basis
of some sort of core? Um, 'cause it-
Robin:
I mean, if the point of understanding is to support action-
Arnold:
Yeah
Robin:
... and the people who take action roughly inherit habits and patterns of
action that make sense according to coherent beliefs that other people have
worked on for the purpose of action, then it makes sense to have a division of
labor where most people just inherit habits and thoughts without thinking them
through, and that some people specialize in making those make sense when you
think them through. But most people can't be bothered, and shouldn't be
bothered, to have to think them through.
Arnold:
Mm-hmm. Good. I think that we've reached a really good point of disagreement
here, which is that I think it really is basically fundamental to philosophy
and philos- philosophical education, and the sort of perspective of
philosophy, that beliefs are important for some reason other than action.
Though, that is itself something philosophers debate, of course, and there are
pragmatists, and so on-
Robin:
Right
Arnold:
... that, um, uh, uh, uh, maybe, maybe that's, that's what we should say, is
that if ideas, and having the right ideas, and having coherent ideas, and all
of that, are important only for action, then one thing follows. And if that's
not the case, then another thing follows. If there's some value to just
having-
Robin:
Right, right
Arnold:
... the truth, or having-
Agnes:
Um, there's an ambiguity when it comes to a claim like, "ideas are only
important for action." Um, one way to, um, uh, hear that claim is, the
differences in ideas has to manifest in a set of different bodily movements.
Another way to hear that claim is, um, performing the same set of bodily
movements, but with a different idea, might give those bodily movements a
different meaning. Uh, and if the second counts as a way of, um, ideas
mattering for action, then I think that many philosophers would be happy with
that. That is, um, we don't necessarily have to go to the theoretical to get,
um, the importance of ideas.
Arnold:
Mm.
Agnes:
Um, but that would just be to say that Tom doesn't, um, act the same as Jerry.
Um, because since Jerry has an understanding of why he's doing some of the
things he's doing, he has a different set of ideas backing his action.
Arnold:
Or at least they're differently responsible, or at least that would be a sign
for what you're saying, is that we would hold Jerry to be more responsible for
doing this stuff on the basis of having thought it through.
Agnes:
Yeah, I'm not sure we would... Uh, um, um, I think if it was negative
responsibility, that is, they did something bad-
Arnold:
Mm
Agnes:
... we might hold them equally responsible. But if it's positive
responsibility, we would hold Jerry more responsible.
Arnold:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
So, so there's a way the conflict is less if you say, "Okay, some people
aspire to this, you know, really understanding things," but if that's only
actually a minority of the... small minority of the population, and most
people don't wanna really understand things that well, they just want good
guides to action that they don't understand, then we need some people to
specialize in understanding things.
Arnold:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
And so those people, it's fine if they have a goal beyond merely helping
everybody else to understand things. They just really wanna understand.
There's a, a consistency in the social arrangement at least, where most people
are just looking for a guide to action, and a few people just really want to
understand, and that's just the central thing to them. But they can have a
nice role in the world, where they help the other people with their action by
understanding, and there's not really a social conflict here, even if there's
a conflict in any one person, which goal they would have.
Arnold:
Yeah, I mean, I, of course, I agree that we should have philosopher kings. Um-
... if that's, if that's what you're saying. Uh, uh, uh-
Agnes:
These are the last words, 'cause we've gone over-
Arnold:
Right
Agnes:
... so you get the last word, Arnold. You agree that we should have
philosopher kings, but go ahead.
Arnold:
No, I, I, I guess I, I hadn't been thinking about this in terms of sort of the
social roles that these kinds of endeavors would play. That is, why we would
wanna train some people as philosophers and other people as not. Um, the, the,
the question for me was something sort of like, um, um, w- w- what, what can I
promise as the good of the education in philosophy, especially the way we now
teach it, which is in this very much, um, decentralized way? Um, that is,
where, where there isn't a sort of coherent, dogmatic theory that we teach.
Again, which is a good thing. Um, but, but maybe it is worth considering the
question, um, w- which is sort of more ready to hand with all of these other
academic disciplines, which is just what, what role are, are these trainees
supposed to play in the, the, the, the social life of human beings? Um, why is
it... Might, might, why might it be important that some of us are, um, good at
system-building, whereas others are good at investigating? Um, and, and it,
it's a sort of truism that if you get a scientist, for example, they're gonna
be very, very, very good at thinking about their specialty. And then if you
ask them about any other topic, they're no better than an ordinary person,
mostly. And um, um, maybe philosophy is the discipline which is supposed to be
teaching people to be good judges in general, um, if anything can be said in
general about how to make those kinds of judgments. And then there's a
substantive question about whether or not, um, you can train somebody in that.
And maybe that's just an unresolved question in philosophy, is: Is there any
such training?
Robin:
I think, um, there's a virtue in having some people, more than we have now,
who just have a more integrated points of view over larger scopes of things.
Arnold:
Mm-hmm.
Robin:
We have become too fragmented in intellectual world, and integration on the
margin would be better. I don't, uh, I don't think we should claim that
everybody should try to be such an integrated person, and then or all their
lives are worthless if they don't have it.
Arnold:
Right.
Robin:
But there's a substantial value practically in it, and just, it's a virtue, I
would say, to have a integrated... I'm happy to agree with you there, at least
for some of us. It's a virtue-
Arnold:
Mm
Robin:
... to generate and sustain an integrated view of things, because that's
beautiful.
Arnold:
Mm-hmm. Okay, well, thank you for, uh, uh, talking this over with me.
Robin:
All right. Until we talk again.
Agnes:
Bye.
Robin:
Bye.